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1. INTRODUCTION
The liquidation regime applicable to failed American banks
was fundamentally altered in 1993 when Congress amended the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act ("FDI Act") to provide that de-
positors' claims be paid before those of general creditors.1 Be-
cause of the definitional structure of the FDI Act, federal regula-
tors interpret the preference as not being available to holders of
foreign deposits- deposits that are payable only abroad.2 Conse-
quently, unless the government were to intervene to bail them
* Harvard A.B. 1978, J.D. 1981. The author is currently Associate General
Counsel of Capital One Financial Corporation, which owns a subsidiary bank
that operates a foreign branch (but does not currently take foreign deposits).
From 1989 to 1995 he held various positions in the Resolutions Section of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Cororation's Legal Division. The views expressed
herein are the author's ownandare not necessarily those of Capital One or the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC").
' See Federal Deposit Insurance Act 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11) (1994). Prior
to the enactment of the federal depositor-preference regime, only state-
chartered banks in about half of the states were subject to such a regime. See
infra notes 24-27. Depositors in national banks, and in state-chartered banks in
the other states, shared pari passu with general creditors in liquidation. See gen-
erally Bert Ely, Surprise! Congress Has Just Enacted What Amounts to a Core
Banking System, AM. BANKER, Sept. 21, 1993, at 24;Depositor Preference Provi-
sion May Pose Some Greater Risks, Banking Experts Warn, DAILY REP. FOR
EXECUTIVES, Sept. 21, 1993, at 181; David J. Ratway, Note, National Depositor
Preference: In an Attempt to Raise Revenue, Congress Completely Ignores a Poten-
tial Disaster, 19 NOvA L. REv. 1121 (1995).
2 See Opinion Letter FDIC-94-1 (Feb. 28, 1994), 2 FDIC LAWS & REGS.
4825 [hereinafter FDIC Opinion]; Federal Reserve Board supervisory letter SR
94-49 (B), Sept. 2, 1994, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 61-145 (1994).
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out, recoveries of foreign-deposit holders in liquidation of a mul-
tinational bank would be drastically reduced or eliminated? The
result would likely be consternation in the international banking
community, disruption of the current system for dealing with
troubled multinational banks, and a serious competitive setback
for U.S. banks operating abroad.4 This Article argues that Con-
gress did not intend those results and that the statute should be
interpreted to rank foreign deposits on a parity with domestic de-
posits in liquidation priority.
2. THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The depositor-preference provision of the FDI Act, appropri-
ately headed "depositor preference," provides that amounts real-
ized upon liquidation or another disposition (in regulatory par-
lance, a "resolution") of an insured depository institution, after
satisfaction of secured claims, be distributed to satisfy claims in
the following order of priority: first, administrative claims of the
receiver; second, "[amny deposit liability of the institution"; third,
general creditors; fourth, subordinated liabilities; and last, claims
of equity holders.' The term "deposit" is elsewhere defined in the
Act as a list of broadly described categories of obligations; in addi-
tion, the definition grants to the FDIC the authority to promul-
gate regulations identifying other obligations as deposits "by gen-
eral usage," except that any foreign deposit "shall not be a deposit
for any of the purposes of [the FDI Act]."6 When Congress en-
acted the depositor-preference provision in 1993, a foreign deposit
was defined as any obligation "payable only at an office... lo-
cated outside of" the United States." That definition was
amended in 1994 to cover any obligation carried on the books
and records of a foreign branch, unless the deposit contract ex-
pressly provided for payment at an office in the United States.!
3 See Appendix A.
4 See FDIC Depositor Preference Provisions May Have Impact on Foreign
Creditors, BANKING DAILY (BNA), Sept. 10, 1993; Depositor Preference Provi-
sion May Pose Some Greater Risks, Banking Experts Warn, BANKING REP.
(BNA), Sept. 27, 1993; Reality of Depositor Preference Appalling to Bank Regula-
tors, NYFed Official Says, BANKING REP. (BNA), Jan. 31, 1994.
5 FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. S 1821 (d) (11) (A).
6 Id. § 1813(l(5).
7 Id § 1813(0(5)(A).
' See id.
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Under either variation, foreign deposits- deposits normally
raised abroad, and payable only abroad- are not "deposits"
within the plain meaning of the Act. That exclusion expressly
applies "for any of the purposes of" the Act, the plain meaning of
which would extend to the depositor-preference provision.
Is a "deposit liability"- the term used in the depositor-
preference provision- different from a "deposit" as defined in the
definitional section and therefore not, literally speaking, restricted
by that definition? That is not a plausible evasion. In common
usage, a "deposit liability" is a liability for a "deposit," and that
common usage recurs throughout the Act. For example, the very
definitional paragraph containing the exclusion of foreign depos-
its gives the FDIC authority to expand the definition of "depos-
its" by identifying obligations that are "deposit liabilities by gen-
eral usage."9 Likewise, the FDIC's controversial cross-guarantee
right is subordinate to "[a]ny deposit liability" of the assessed in-
stitution.1" Moreover, the provision of the FDI Act governing
the termination of separate insurance of deposits assumed by ac-
quiring institutions is activated when "liabilities ... for deposits"
of one insured institution are assumed by another." On a literal
level, therefore, the exclusion of foreign deposits from liquidation
status as deposits is hard to escape.
On a superficial level, that literal approach gains support in at
least some of the purposes underlying the Act. The principal
purpose of the depositor-preference provision was budgetary, to
save money for the federal government.12 Because the FDIC in-
9 Id. S 1813(0(5) (emphasis added).
10 Id. S 1815(e)(2)(C)(ii)(l). The FDIC's cross-guarantee claim is also sub-
ordinate to third-party general-creditor claims, a class that would include for-
eign deposits. See id. S 1815(e)(2)(C)(ii) Im). The constitutionality of the cross-
guarantee power was upheld in Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), and Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. FDIC, 62 F.3d 449 (2d
Cir. 1995). See also Christopher T. Curtis, The Takings Clause and Regulatoy
Takeovers of Banks and Thrifts, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367, 385-89 (1990).
l1 12 U.S.C. S 1818(q).
12 See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 96 (1993) (reciting a Congressional Budget
Office estimate that depositor preference would save the FDIC $490 million
and the RTC $260 million over the period from 1994 to 1998). The budgetary
purpose- as opposed to a regulatory or safety-and-soundness purpose- of the
depositor-preference regime was widely reported in the trade press while the
bill was moving through Congress. Depositor preference was preferred by the
banking industry to the alternative proposed money-raising device, -additional
examination fees. See infra note 56.
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sures only "deposits" as defined in the statute, and not other obli-
gations such as general creditor claims, requiring a failed institu-
tion's assets to be dedicated first to deposit liabilities would
minimize the loss to the FDIC resulting from its insurance obliga-
tion; and because the FDIC's outlays are scored on the federal
budget (although it is not an appropriated agency and derives its
revenues from insurance premiums), a reduction in the FDIC's
resolutions costs will marginally reduce the federal deficit 13- as-
suming that the FDIC's premium income is not correspondingly
reduced as it subsequently has been. Because foreign deposits are
uninsured, classifying them with general creditor obligations
rather than with domestic deposits would transfer the share of as-
sets that would have been theirs under a pro rata regime to do-
mestic deposit claims, including the claim of the FDIC as subro-
gee of the insured depositors," and hence would reduce the
FDIC's outlay in the liquidation of an insolvent institution hold-
ing any such foreign deposits. To that extent, subordinating for-
eign deposits to domestic deposits would serve the principal pur-
pose of the depositor-preference law.
Other provisions of the FDI Act demonstrate a specific Con-
gressional antipathy toward foreign deposits as well as a desire to
disfavor them in bank failures. When the FDIC received its statu-
tory least-cost-resolution mandate in 1991," s it was specifically in-
structed to expend its insurance funds only to cover insured de-
posits6 That mandate, of course, excludes foreign deposits,
which were always understood to be uninsured. In addition,
Congress simultaneously added a new section 41 to the FDI Act,
"Payments on foreign deposits prohibited," forbidding the FDIC
13 H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 87. See also the Conference Report on the
depositor- p reference law, which stated: "Depositor preference will increase the
amount of the distribution to depositors of failed institutions. Because the
FDIC is subrogated to the claims of insured depositors, it will increase its re-
covery and therefore realize a savings under a depositor preference scheme."
H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 436 (1993).
14 See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11) (A)(g) (noting that the FDIC is subrogated to
claims of insured depositors w om it has paid).
15 See id. 1823(c)(4).
1 See id. 1823 (c)(4)(E). The FDIC may cover uninsured deposits where
they pay for themselves through a sufficiently increased premium paid by the
failed bank's acquirer. See id. 5 1823(c)(4)(E)(iii). So qualified, theprohiition
on covering uinsured deposits is actually no more than a corollary of the
more general least-cost mandate, making the specific statutory paragraph re-
dundait. See 12 C.F.R. § 360 (1993).
[Vol. 21:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss2/1
FEDERAL DEPOSITOR-PREFERENCE LAW
and any other federal agency to make payments on behalf of, or
provide assistance for the benefit of, foreign deposits, except that
the FDIC may take such action if it determines that the action is
not inconsistent with its least-cost-resolution mandate."7 Since the
least-cost mandate generally forbids such payments except in a
systemic risk resolution"s- to which section 41 by its terms
would itself be no bar- section 41 added little of substance to the
Act, save perhaps the suggestion that Congress disliked foreign
deposits. If that is indeed the legislative state of mind embodied
in the FDI Act as currently in force, subordinating foreign depos-
its to domestic deposits in liquidation is certainly consistent with
it.
A closer examination of the legislative history, however, re-
veals that Congress was actually far more sensitive to the needs of
U.S. banks doing business abroad than a recitation of the statu-
tory language and purposes in broad brush strokes would suggest.
3. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Before reviewing the evidence of what Congress was actually
thinking about foreign deposits in the early 1990s, it is necessary
to emphasize the propriety of doing so. Even when statutory
language appears to be clear, the touchstone of statutory interpre-
tation remains Congressional intent. Clear language is the best
evidence of intent, but it is not the only evidence: it is equally
necessary to examine the structure and purposes of the statute as
well as the legislative history. Specifically with respect to an os-
tensibly clear definitional provision, such as the one at issue here,
no less an authority than the Supreme Court has ruled that such a
provision may be disregarded if giving effect to it would violate
an important purpose of the statute. 9
Even without delving into the legislative history, a number of
factors combine to suggest that rigorous literalism is not the ap-
propriate approach to understanding Congress' use of the term
"deposit" in the depositor-preference law.
First, the ordinary meaning of the term "deposit" is not lim-
ited by the country in which the deposit is taken or payable.
17 12 U.S.C. S 1831r.
18 See id. S 1823(c)(4)(G).
19 See Lawson v. Suwannee S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198 (1949); see also C-Line,
Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1043, 1048 (D. R.I. 1974).
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Rather, it refers to a particular kind of bank obligation, regardless
of the country in which it is taken or payable. For example, in
the very 1994 law in which Congress amended the FDI Act's
definition of "deposit" to reemphasize that a deposit had to be
payable in the United States to qualify for FDIC insurance, Con-
gress also amended the Federal Reserve Act to limit American
banks' liability for deposits taken and payable abroad that could
not be paid abroad by reason of various force majeure circum-
stances. In that provision, Congress referred to that particular
class of deposits as "any deposit made at a foreign branch of the
bank.""0 The Federal Reserve Board, in its regulations under the
International Banking Act, defines a "foreign bank" as an entity
organized under the laws of a foreign country that, inter alia,
"[r]eceives deposits to a substantial extent in the regular course of
its business" and "has the power to accept demand deposits.""
These examples show that Congress and the regulators share the
same general understanding of what a deposit is, and they use the
term in its ordinary sense outside the FDI Act when describing
deposits that are foreign deposits' and hence not "deposits" for
purposes of the FDI Act.Y Caution is required, therefore, in as-
suming that Congress could not have had that ordinary meaning
in mind when enacting the depositor-preference law in 1993.
Second, the fact that the depositor-preference provision and
the amendments to the FDI Act's definition of "deposit" were
adopted at different times suggests that Congress did not focus on
the definition when the depositor-preference provision was en-
acted. It is more likely that Congress and its drafters had in mind
the common understanding of the term "deposit"- which would
have included foreign deposits.
Finally, the purpose of the depositor-preference provision-
to govern distribution of a bank's assets upon liquidation- is dif-
ferent from the general purpose of the FDI Act, which is primar-
ily to govern deposit-insurance rights and obligations. Statutory
20 Federal Reserve Act § 24C, 12 U.S.C. § 633 (1994) (emphasis added).
21 12 C.F.R. S 211.2() (Regulation K) (1995) (emphasis added).
2 An expansive view of the term "deposit" in the depositor-preference
provision is further supported by the proposition that statutory exceptions to
broader concepts- as the foreign-deposit definition is an exception to the
broader concept of "deposit"- are to be narrowly construed. See Piedmont &
Northern Ry. Co. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1932); Israel-British Bank
(London) Ltd. v. FDIC, 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2dCir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978
(1976).
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terminology, when used for different purposes in separate provi-
sions, can reasonably have distinct meanings in the respective
provisions. There may be logic to limiting deposit insurance to
domestic deposits: the purpose of deposit insurance is to protect
the domestic financial system and domestic depositors from fi-
nancial panics, using insurance paid for by domestic financial in-
stitutions, underwritten by the federal government, and ulti-
mately supported by taxpayer money. If foreign governments are
similarly motivated to protect deposits in branches within their
territories, they can establish similar insurance systems at their
own risk and expense- just as the United States insures deposits
in U.S. branches of foreign banks.' The liquidation priority re-
gime, on the other hand, governs the distribution of private assets
to private claimants. There is much less reason to discriminate
against foreign claimants, especially since many of the assets, like
many of the deposits, may be foreign.
A large body of analogous state statutes indicates the approach
taken by state legislatures to the problem of what to do with for-
eign deposits in a depositor-preference regime. Twenty-nine
states had depositor-preference laws in 1993. Not one of them
specifically excluded foreign deposits from the benefit of the pref-
erence. Most of them referred to deposits, or to obligations or
claims of depositors, without providing any relevant restrictive
definition24 (possibly in part because of the difficulty in defining
See International Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. S 3104(b). Federal insurance of
deposits in branches of foreign banks is of less significance now, because post-
BCCI U.S. law requires foreign banks to establish U.S. subsidiaries if they wish
to conduct a retail deposit business in the United States. Insured branches in
operation at the time that that requirement was enacted were permitted to con-
tinue operating. See id. S 3104(d).
4 The following states' depositor-preference statutes used the term "de-
posit" without relevant definition: ALASKA STAT. S 06.05.470(t)(4) (Michie
1999); CONN. STAT. ANN. S 36(a)(237) (West 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
9-B § 365(10)(B) (West 1997);N.M. STAT. ANN. S 58-1-75(H)(4) (Michie 1978).
A number of states' depositor-preference laws used the term"claims of deposi-
tors" or an equivalent formulation referencing depositors rather than deposits,
without relevant definition: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 6-395.11.A.5 (West
1999); COLO. REV. STAT. S 11-5-104(9)(a)(11) (1987); GA. CODE ANN. 5 7-1-
202(a)(2) (lvichie 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. 5 412:2-400; IDAHO CODE 5 26-
1019(3) (Michie 1947); IOWA CODE ANN. S 524.1312(3) (West 1946); KANSAS
STAT. ANN. S 9-1906(b)(3) (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 49.24 subd. 9 (West
Supp. 2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. 5 361.190(2) (West 1968 & Supp. 2000); MONT.
CODE ANN. S 32-1-534(1)(d) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-07-52(3) (Supp.
1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6 S 1204(K)(1)(6) (West 1965);OR. REV. STAT.
711.520(3) (1953 & Supp. 1998); TEX. CODE ANN. S 342-804a(2) (West 1964 &
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the concept of "deposit" analytically5 ). Those statutes would in-
clude foreign deposits within the preference. Only four states had
adopted depositor-preference laws that incorporated by reference
the FDI Act's definition of "deposit;" 26 and only one of those
Supp. 2000) (repealed 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. S 7-2-15(1)(d) (1995); W. VA.
CODE § 31A-7-12(a)(3) (Michie 1996). The Texas bank depositor-preference
law was repealed in 1993 as a result of the FDIC 's resolution of the First City
banks that had been closed in October 1992. The FDIC protected federal-
funds obligations of the failed First City national banks but not those of the
failed state banks, because the federal-funds obligations were not deposits and
hence, in the state banks, were more likely to Tbear a substantial loss in the
event that assets were insufficient to pay all liabilities in full. See Appendix A.
The Texas Bank Commissioner and managers of Texas state-chartered banks,
concerned that such a regime would make it more difficult for state banks to
obtain funding, obtained the repeal of the depositor-preference law. See TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4a (West 1995); Least Cost Provisions in Texas Fail-
ure Put State Banks at a Competitive Disadvantage, FDIC WATCH, Nov. 23,
1992, at 3; Shawna P. Johanssen et al., Banking Law, 47 SMU L. REV. 683, 737-
38 (1994). The Texas savings and loan depositor-preference law was not re-
pealed, having perhaps escaped attention. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
852a (West 1999). The Nebraska and South Dakota statutes used both the term
"deposit" and the term "depositor," defining neither in relevant respect. See
NEB. REV. STAT. S 8-1,110 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-15-39(3) (Michie
1990). The Tennessee statute defined the term "deposit", without any limita-
tion that would exclude foreign deposits. See TENN. CODE ANN. % 45-1-
103(6), 45-2-1504(h)(1)D) (1993) Three states used the term"deposit obliga-
tion," without relevant definition, in a model statute designed and promoted
by the FDIC in the 1980s IND. CODE S 28-1-3.1-10(3) (1986) (repealed May
13, 1993, by P.L. 42-1993 § 103); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:395(A)(3) (West
1950); VA. CODE ANN. 9 6.1-110.9 (Michie 1999). See J. Michael Cutshaw &
Walter F. Stuart IV, Louisiana's Banking Revolution: Recodification and Multi-
banking, 59 TUL. L. REV. 602, 637 (1985); William M. Isaac, The Role of Deposit
Insurance in the Emerging Financial Services Industry, 1 YALEJ. ON REG. 195,
213 (1984). By the 1990s, the FDIC no longer publicly took a position on the
desirability of depositor preference; and the ederal depositor-preference law, as
discussed below, was enacted for reasons unrelated to sound bank regulation.
25 The broad definitions of "deposit" in the FDI Act and in the Federal
Reserve Board's regulations under tihe Federal Reserve Act, Regulation D, 12
C.F.R. § 204.2(a), are workable because they apply only to obligations of in-
sured depository institutions. The definitions include many items, such as
credit balances, that are also held by non-depository institutions such as retail-
ers and other merchants, and which if regarded as deposits might well cause
those enterprises to violate state statutes precluding the taking of deposits
without a financial institution charter, as well as the Bank Holding Company
Act's provisions governing companies that own deposit-taking enterprises.
However, in those statutes, the term "deposit" is generally not defined and
therefore can be applied according to its common usage.
26 CAL.FIN. CODE S 3119.5(a)(3) (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 658.84
(West 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 395:30 (1999); and R.I. GEN. LAWS
19-15-7, 19-15-7.1 (1998).
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states, California, acknowledged the unusual status of foreign de-
posits in the definition, specifically including foreign deposits
within the preference.' Hence, the statutes that are the best evi-
dence of what a legislature would think about the appropriateness
of including foreign deposits in depositor preference- and the ex-
amples that were before Congress in 1993 to the extent that Con-
gress might have considered that issue- are statutes that broadly
applied the common understanding of the term "deposit" to in-
clude foreign deposits.
Fortified by the foregoing considerations, we turn to the rele-
vant legislative history of the FDI Act. That legislative history
confirms that the exclusion of foreign deposits from the defini-
tion of "deposits" had nothing to do with the fair distribution of
assets upon liquidation, and everything to do with the desired al-
location of the burden of insurance premiums. The modern defi-
nition of "deposit" in the FDI Act originated in the Banking Act
of 1935.8 A review of the Act's legislative history makes clear
that foreign deposits were excluded from the definition of "de-
posit" because it was feared that imposing deposit insurance pre-
miums on them would place U.S. banks operating abroad at a
cost disadvantage in raising funds overseas. As one Congressman
noted, the exclusion of foreign deposits "is there because, if they
had the cost of the insurance to add to their operating cost, they
would be in a bad competitive situation in a foreign country."2 9
Concern for the competitive position of U.S. banks overseas has
continued unabated for most of the Twentieth century. During
the deliberations on the FDIC Improvement Act in 1991 ("Im-
provement Act"), Senator Garn recited that concern as one of the
"very good reasons why such [insurance] assessments [on foreign
deposits] have been considered and rejected at least nine times
since the 1930s.
" 30
The legislative history of the 1991 Improvement Act is espe-
cially pertinent because that Act represented the high-water mark
27 The California preference extends to "deposits," as defined in 12 U.S.C.
S 1813(0, but includes obligations of the type described in 12 U.S.C. 55
1813(o(5)(A) and (B) (that is, foreign deposits). See CAL. FIN CODE 5
3119.5(a)(3) (West 1999).
28 See 12 U.S.C. S 264(c)(12) (1935).
29 Hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 74th
Cong., 71-72 (1935) (colloquy between Congressman Hollister and General
Counsel Birdzell of the FDIC, which had been created two years earlier).
30 137 CoNG. REC. S16904 (Nov. 18, 1991).
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(so far) of anti-foreign-deposit sentiment in Congress. The Im-
provement Act added the new section 41, described above, for-
bidding federal provision of assistance for the benefit of foreign
deposits.31 Section 41 was motivated by Congress' anger over a
perceived pattern of the FDIC's bailing out large banks and mak-
ing their depositors whole- including holders of foreign deposits,
although no insurance premiums had been paid on those depos-
its- while smaller banks were closed and liquidated and their un-
insured depositors were made to bear a pro-rata share of the insti-
tution's loss. 2 Many of the bank-resolution transactions recited
by opponents of the FDIC's practice- First Pennsylvania, Con-
tinental Illinois, First Republic, Bank of New England33- were
312 O.S.C. § 1831r.
32 The Congressional attitude was ably summarized by Senator Sasser:
There has never been a bank failure where foreign deposits have not
been made whole. In one way or another, the Federal Government
has stood behind an estimated $22 billion.., in foreign deposits over
the last decade. In 1980, for example, First Pennsylvania failed with
over $2 billion in foreign deposits on its books, and they were cov-
ered. Four years later, Continental Illinois went under with a whop-
ping $18.5 billion of overseas deposits. Nearly $900 million was in-
sured at the First Republic; $138 billion [sic] at First City [in the 1988
open-assistance transaction]. In August 1990, $85 million of deposits
at the Bahamas branch of National Bank of Washington... were
bailed out. In January, depositors at the Bank of New England's
Cayman Islands branch got help from the FDIC to the tune of $100
million. The problem... is these banks did not pay 1 cent of premi-
ums to ensure these foreign deposits. Yet, they were fully insured by
the Federal Government .... The coverage of foreign deposits is par-
ticularly unfair when it is considered that community banks pay pre-
miums on all their domestic deposits, but typically the FDIC only
covers those up to $100,000 in a small bank failure. The failure of
Freedom National Bank in Harlem last year was a good example of
this phenomenon; many charities were left holding the bag because of
the FDIC policy. However, at just the same time the FDIC arranged
a transaction that resulted in fill coverage for the depositors at the
Bahamas branch of the National Bank of Washington, even though
NBW never paid premiums on those deposits.
137 CONG. REC. S16903-04 (Nov. 18, 1991) (statement of Sen. Sasser).
" This does not include National Bank of Washington, a resolution that
was the source of some of the greatest distress by reason of its temporal coinci-
dence with the failure of Freedom National Bank, a small black-owned-and-
operated bank in Harlem, N.Y. The FDIC resolved the Freedom failure in
compliance with its statutory requirement not to spend more on an assisted
acquisition than it would spend in a liquidation; no bidders for the failed bank
had appeared who were willing to mike up the cost of protecting the unin-
sured depositors. See S. REP. NO. 102-167, at 3-4, 44 (1991). At the time of
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transactions in which the FDIC made uninsured depositors whole
in order to prevent disruption and loss of confidence in the na-
tion's banking system, even though that required spending more
than would have been necessary to effect a resolution in which
depositors were protected only up to the insurance limit (which
in the case of foreign deposits, of course, is zero). To take such
action, the FDIC relied on what it characterized as the "essential-
ity" exception- commonly called the "too big to fail" doctrine-
to the pre-Improvement Act requirement that an FDIC-funded
acquisition of a failed or failing bank be no more expensive than a
liquidation.34 The FDIC's ability to effect such transactions sur-
vived in the Improvement Act under the heading "systemic
risk."3 s As noted above, a "systemic risk" resolution, which re-
quires among other things a finding that the transaction is neces-
sary to avert "serious adverse effects on economic conditions or
financial stability,"36 is an exception to the current least-cost re-
quirement, and hence an exception to section 41's prohibition on
assistance to foreign deposits.
That statutory structure suggests a tension between Congress'
desire to suppress transactions protecting foreign deposits and its
recognition of the importance of foreign deposits to the U.S.
banking system." The legislative history of the systemic risk ex-
ception- specifically the provisions concerning how systemic
that resolution, the FDIC's politically astute chairman, L. William Seidman,
was in the hospital after falling off a horse. He later suggested that the resolu-
tion would have been handled differently had he been actively at the agency's
helm.
' "No assistance shall be provided under this subsection in an amount in
excess of that amount which the [FDIC] determines to be reasonably necessary
to save the cost of liquidating, including paying the insured accounts of, such
insured depository institution, except that such restriction shall not apply in
any case in which the [FDIC] determines that the continued operation of such
insured depository institution is essential to provide adequate depository serv-
ices in its community." 12 U.S.C. $ 1823(c)(4)(A).
11 12 U.S.C. S 1823(c)(4)(G).
36 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(().
17 As one of the Congressional opponents to the FDIC's practice with re-
spect to foreign deposits remarked, "[,]t is my hope that the reformed too-big-to-fail policy will prevent the FDIC from bailing out foreign deposits. But past
history and the realities of the structure of our financial system suggest t at,
despite the reforms in this legislation, the FDIC may at some point have to
cover foreign deposits at largebanks in order to avert the collapse of our finan-
cial system." 137 CONG. REc. S16906 (Nov. 18, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Conrad).
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risk resolutions are to be paid for- throws that tension into star-
tlingly clear focus. The statement by Senator Garn reproduced
above was made in the course of a colloquy on that subject.38 The
Senate was considering an amendment to its version of the Im-
provement Act to provide that, in the case of a systemic risk reso-
lution in which holders of foreign deposits received more than
they would have received in a least-cost resolution, the FDIC
must recover the incremental cost of such protection by means of
special assessments on insured institutions allocated proportion-
ally to the amount of foreign deposits held by those institutions.39
That amendment was proposed as an alternative to including for-
eign deposits in the deposit-insurance assessment base, an action
that Senator Gan staunchly opposed, claiming it would render
U.S. banks uncompetitive in raising deposits overseas. "Most for-
eign deposits are raised and used overseas," he said. "A 25-30 basis
point assessment [which was the deposit-insurance rate range in
the early 1990s] could cause U.S. banks to either lose customers
or lose money, putting them out of this business."4" He also ar-
gued that the withdrawal of U.S. banks from their overseas fund-
ing sources would reduce the available funding for U.S. exports. 1
Other senators would have liked to include foreign deposits in the
insurance assessment base, but did not advocate such a proposal
because they assumed it would be unacceptable to the House and
hence would not survive the joint conference on the Improve-
ment Act.42
Those senators were right to be concerned. Even their "com-
promise" amendment did not survive the conference.43 At a pub-
lic session on the evening of November 25, 1991, the conference
had before it three proposals for funding systemic risk resolutions
involving foreign deposits.' A House proposal would have re-
covered the cost of systemic risk resolutions by means of special
38 See text accompanying supra note 30.
3 See 137 CONG. REC. at S16902 (discussing Amendment No. 1350(6)(B)(ii)).
40 Id. at S16904 (statement of Sen. Garn).
41 See id.
42 See id. at S16904 (statement of Sen. Kohl); id. at S16906 (statement of
Sen. Conrad).
41 See Transcript of House-Senate Joint Conference on H.R. 3768 and S.
543 (Nov. 25, 1991) [hereinafter Conference Transcript].
4 See id.
[Vol. 21:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss2/1
FEDERAL DEPOSITOR-PREFERENCE LAW
assessments on the traditional assessment base, comprising domes-
tic deposits.45 The Senate bill (unamended) called for the special
assessments to be based on total assets minus capital, a base that,
though expressed in terms of assets and capital, clearly would
have included foreign deposits.46 That proposal was ultimately
enacted,4" in preference to both the House proposal and a third
proposal, the Senate's "compromise" amendment to its own bill,
which would have specifically assessed insurance fund members
on the basis of the foreign deposits they held to recoup the in-
cremental costs of covering foreign deposits in a systemic risk
resolution."
While the House proposal was unacceptable to the Senate, the
Senate's proposed special assessment on foreign deposits was un-
acceptable to the House. Representative Schumer succinctly
stated the competing goals: "One is to make sure that foreign de-
posits don't get a free ride... The other is to make sure we don't
chase foreign deposits in our own institutions to foreign institu-
tions."49  The House members rejected the Senate's proposed
amendment, because they believed that foreign deposits should
never be assessed for insurance costs. Representative Schumer ar-
gued that: "If you start assessing foreign deposits, given the close
margins with which this business is competitively run, you are
going to chase billions and billions and billions of dollars out of
our banks and into other banks."" Although the House mem-
bers were told that the Senate's proposal was only for a special as-
sessment to recover the cost of a systemic risk transaction, and
was therefore "not an ongoing cost,"" the House members were
not satisfied; their concern was that "[a]s soon as one large bank
fails, the assessment occurs and the foreign deposits flee."52
45 See id.
46 See id. at 118-19, 127.
47 The statute prescribes that the assessment base shall be "the amount of
each [deposit insurance fund] member's average total assets ... minus the sum
of the amount of the member's average total tangible equity and the amount of
the member's average total subordinated debt." FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. 1823
(c)(4)(a)(ii) (I) (1999).
41 See Conference Transcript, supra note 43, at 108.
49 Id. at 110.
50 Id. at 111.
1 Id. at 120 (statement of Sen. Gramm).
52 Id. at 120 (statement of Rep. Schumer). "The risk is even greater be-
cause you put every single institution with foreign deposits at tremendous risk.
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The deadlock among legislators was eventually broken when
the conferees requested the opinion of the Treasury Department
and the Federal Reserve Board. The representatives of those
agencies noted that: (1) the systemic risk exception to the least-
cost requirement was necessary; (2) the scope of possible coverage
had to extend to foreign deposits; and (3) a post hoc special as-
sessment on a base that was broader than domestic deposits and
included foreign deposits was acceptable.53 As a result, the Senate
bill's approach, but not that of the Senate amendment, was
adopted. From the legislators' point of view, it had two merits.
First, it did not explicitly assess foreign deposits or any other li-
abilities- a semantic point, but apparently an important one
since it received a great deal of discussion. 4 Second, the special
assessments to cover the costs of systemic risk resolutions, includ-
ing those with a substantial foreign-deposit element, would be
spread over a wider base than foreign deposits."5
As a result, the cost of protecting foreign deposits in a sys-
temic risk resolution that will be borne by other foreign-deposit-
holding institutions is less than it would have been if the Senate
amendment, with its assessment specifically on foreign deposits,
had been adopted, and also less than it would have been if foreign
deposits were included in the overall deposit-insurance assessment
base and no special assessment were provided for. Under the Sen-
ate proposal, excess costs of covering foreign deposits would have
been borne solely by the other foreign deposits in the banking
system and not shared with domestic deposits. In addition, under
the alternative of including foreign deposits in the deposit base,
while domestic deposits would have shared the cost of covering
foreign deposits, so would foreign deposits have shared the cost of
covering domestic deposits. As Appendix B shows, the cost ad-
vantage to foreign deposits of the alternative that Congress
adopted in the Improvement Act is dramatic.
The lesson of the foregoing legislative history is that Con-
gress, in 1991, was extremely sensitive to the risk of creating a
competitive disadvantage to U.S. banks raising foreign deposits,
even in the event of a major bank failure in the course of which
You could wipe out 60, 70 percent of their equity." Id. (statement of Sen. La-
Falce).
-1 See id. at 129-30.
54 See id. at 116-20.
51 See id. at 133-34.
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foreign deposits would arguably be asked to pay no more than
their own freight. A liquidation regime subordinating foreign
deposits to domestic deposits, in a period such as the early 1990s
in which bank failures were common events, would place U.S.
banks at an even greater competitive disadvantage in raising funds
overseas. When the depositor-preference provision was enacted,
Congress expected that general creditor recoveries under it would
ordinarily be zero. 6 It is not plausible that Congress would have
consciously legislated such a fate for foreign deposits while simul-
taneously displaying such solicitude over the competitive status of
U.S. banks' foreign deposit raising activities.
There is no evidence that Congress' attitude changed in the
less than two years between the Improvement Act and enactment
of the depositor preference law. As noted above, the depositor-
preference regime was not enacted for reasons having to do with
safe and sound bank regulation or with orderly liquidation, but
rather, as indicated by its inclusion in the Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act of 1993, entirely for budgetary reasons- it was a
means for the federal government to spend less money. The
House report on the Budget Act forthrightly enumerated deposi-
tor preference as one of five measures adopted "[t]o comply with
the instructions of the conference agreement on the budget reso-
lution to reduce the deficit by $3.758 billion for fiscal years 1994
through 1998."s1 The contribution of depositor preference to-
56 "As a result of this depositor preference, creditors who are not deposi-
tors are unlikely to recover any of their claims on failed institutions." H.R.
REP. NO. 103-111, at 95 (1993). Actual recoveries of foreign depositors would
depend on the loss ratio of the failed institution as well as the ratio of priority
to non-priority obligations. Zero recovery is certainly a plausible outcome. In
the hypothetical institution described in Appendix A with its 80% ratio of asset
recoveries to liabilities, distribution on foreign-deposit claims falls to zero as
the ratio of domestic deposits rises to 89% of total liabilities. Bank troubles
were not limited to small domestic institutions: The financial difficulties of
America's largest multinational bank, Citibank, were well known. See Brett D.
Fromson & Jerry Knight, The Saving of Citibank- Partnership of Regulators,
CEO Brings Firm through Crisis, WASH. POST, May 16, 1993, at Al.
Citibank was placed on the government's 'watch list' of prob-
lem banks in December 1991. The list is not made public,
but every quarter the government reports how many banks
are on it and totals their assets. The year-end report showed
little change in the number of banks but a huge jump in the
assets. Everyone in banking knew that Citibank had gone on
the list.
Id.
H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 87 (1993).
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ward that goal, according to the House report, was $750 million.58
The administration's original proposal for raising that revenue-
imposition of federal examination fees on state-chartered banks-
was rejected and replaced by the depositor preference regime pro-
posed by the Conference of State Banking Supervisors, which did
not want state-chartered banks to bear the entire burden of that
budgetary element.5 9 The administration's preferred version of
depositor-preference would have increased its budgetary impact
by extending liquidation preference only to the insured deposits,
so that the only beneficiary of the preference would have been
the FDIC rather than private depositors. Congress rejected that
version at the insistence of the lobby of the smaller banks, which
feared that they would be competitively disadvantaged."
No inference regarding Congress' view of the correct liquida-
tion status of foreign deposits can be drawn from its amendment
to the foreign deposit definition in 1994. As noted above, the
amendment clarified that a deposit carried on the books of a for-
eign branch is a foreign deposit, and hence not a "deposit" for
purposes of the FDI Act, unless the deposit agreement explicitly
permits payment in the United States.61 That amendment was
originally drafted in 199162 before the depositor-preference regime
was proposed, and for reasons unrelated to it. The amendment
accompanied a parallel amendment to the Federal Reserve Act
providing that member banks would not be liable to repay depos-
its made at a foreign branch if the foreign branch could not repay
the deposit due to specified circumstances of force majeure or act
" See id. at 96. That estimate was based on Congressional Budget Office
projections of prospective bank and thrift failures, which were probably over-
stated.
" See Bill Atkinson, States Push Alternatives to Hitting Their Banks with
Higher Fees, AM. BANKER, Mar. 30, 1993, at 7; Arthur D. Postal, Senate Kills
Exam Fees for Now; Issue May Resurface Next Year, THOMSON'S INT'L BANKING
REGULATORAM., June 14, 1993, at 3.
o Smaller banks objected to limiting the preference to insured deposits on
the ground that they would not be able to attract deposits in excess of the in-
surance limit. Those excess deposits would migrate to large banks. The small
banks argued that excess depositors would assume that the regulators would
treat the large banks as "too big to fail" and would therefore cover all deposits
in full in case of trouble. See Arthur D. Postal, Budget Bill Rolls Back Restric-
tions in FDICIA, AM. BANKER, June 14, 1993, at 1; Robert M. Garsson,
Clinton's Proposal for Bigger Haircuts Seem Destined for Defeat in Senate Panel,
AM. BANKER, June 7, 1993, at 18.
61 SeeFDI Act, 12 U.S.C. S 1813(0(5)(A).
62 S. REP. No. 102-167, at 1131 (1991).
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of state.63 The amendments were designed to reverse a line of
court decisions allowing depositors in foreign branches to recover
their deposits from the bank's home office in such circumstances.
In the case of Vietnamese depositors, for example, permitting re-
covery of their deposits after the conquest of South Vietnam by
the North prevented depositors from accessing their deposits."
The amendments were proposed with the support of the Federal
Reserve Board in 1991 as part of the FDIC Improvement Act,6"
but were among the many provisions removed from the bill in
the final weeks and days before its passage in order to reduce con-
troversy and accelerate enactment in response to the FDIC's then-
perceived imminent need for more funds.66 The interested parties
returned to the legislative well in 1994 and obtained the language
that they had earlier proposed, unchanged.
As the foregoing recitation shows, there is compelling evi-
dence of Congress' sensitivity to the perceived need not to disad-
vantage foreign deposits held by U.S. banks. Furthermore, there
is no contrary evidence that anything Congress did to the relevant
statutory provisions was motivated by a desire to radically disad-
vantage foreign deposits in the event of bank failure.
4. INTERNATIONAL LAW
If foreign deposits were subordinated to domestic deposits, the
liquidation regime applicable to U.S. banks with foreign branches
would be inconsistent with international law. A familiar postu-
late of U.S. law, however, is that international law is a part of
U.S. law and that, if possible, domestic legislation is to be inter-
preted consistently with international law.67 A conflict between
the depositor-preference regime and international law, therefore,
is an additional reason for concluding that Congress did not in-
tend to subordinate foreign deposits.
63 Federal Reserve Act S 25C, 12 U.S.C. S 633 (1994).
4 See Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, 936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1991);
Trinh v. Citibank, 850 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1988).
65 See S. REP. NO. 102-167, at 207, 527 (1991).
66 See H.R. REP. No. 102-330, at 92 (1991).
67 See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2Cranch) 64, 118
(1804); CFTC v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 493 D.C. Cir. 1984); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(1986).'
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U.S. law is already inconsistent in its approach to the liquida-
tion of multinational banks. In general, a U.S. bank and its for-
eign branches are part of the same legal entity, so that the assets
and liabilities of any part are the assets and liabilities of the
whole." That is the distinction between branches and subsidiar-
ies. The foreign force majeure cases noted above69 were premised
on that underlying reality, which is also reflected in the federal
liquidation regime: the FDIC as receiver of a failed bank collects
and realizes upon all assets, and responds to all claims, of the insti-
tution regardless of their situs. ° That is the unitary or "single en-
tity" approach to bank liquidation.
Liquidation of U.S. branches of a foreign bank is subject to a
dramatically different regime. Upon the insolvency of a foreign
bank or the inability of its U.S. branch to meet claims against it,
the receiver takes possession of all assets of the bank in the United
States and uses their proceeds to pay claimants who did business
with the bank in the United States.71 Proceeds are turned over to
the foreign bank's home-country liquidator for distribution to
other claimants against the bank only if there is value left over af-
ter claimants in the United States are made whole. This manner
of segregating local assets to pay local claims is known as the
"separate entity" approach to multinational bank liquidation.72
"Balkanization" might be a more appropriate term. The ad-
verse effects of the separate entity approach are well documented,
and were dramatically illustrated in the BCCI collapse. Creditors
in some jurisdictions are short-changed, while those in other ju-
risdictions get a windfall, especially if their jurisdiction applies a
U.S. style regime, in which the liquidator takes over all of the as-
sets of the bank in that jurisdiction, and not just the assets of the
branch. There may be friction among liquidators competing for
68 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston (Int'l) v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 658
F.2d 895, 900 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091 (1982).
69 See Citibank, NA., 936 F.2d at 723; Trinh v. Citibank, NA., 850 F.2d at
1164.
70 See FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1821; FDIC Opinion,supra note 2.
See International Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. S 3102() (1995).
72 The U.S. approach actually goes beyond segregation of the assets of the
branch: the receiver is to take possession ofall assets of the foreign bank in the
United States for the benefit of claimants who did business with the bank in
the United States, regardless of whether those assets were booked at, or related
to the operations of, the bank's branches or agencies in the United States. See
id.
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assets whose location is legally ambiguous. For example, securi-
ties may be issued by an issuer residing in one jurisdiction, carried
on the books of a branch in a second, and held by a custodian in a
third. To combat such risks to creditors in their jurisdictions,
host country supervisors may seek to limit inter-branch exposures
within the group, argue with one another over the proper alloca-
tion of assets and capital, and require the allocation of separate
capital in their jurisdictions to a greater extent than would be in-
dicated by efficient global corporate finance. Counterparties, for
their part, may shun branches in single-entity jurisdictions for
those in separate-entity jurisdictions, seek to do business with the
strongest branch, and prefer to do business only with a branch in
their own country, if they feel they would thereby get a liquida-
tion preference either de jure or through effective influence in the
host country's liquidation system. Derivatives markets may be
impaired by the uncertain validity of multi-branch netting ar-
rangements. In sum, the separate-entity approach could substan-
tially impair the efficiency of global financial markets.
While there may be a trend in transnational bankruptcy law
favoring a single-entity approach in cross-border insolvency pro-
ceedings, 3 it is no violation of international law to segregate local
assets for the benefit of local creditors. Local segregation has been
a traditional approach, not yet successfully displaced by treaties or
uniform state practice.' In the United States, the constitutional-
ity of such segregation was established in United States v. Pink,
which upheld the legality of the Litvinov Assignment."
The specific legal objection to the depositor-preference re-
gime, if it is interpreted as subordinating foreign deposits, is not
simply that it prefers domestic creditors to non-domestic credi-
tors, but that it establishes that preference in the context of a sin-
gle-entity liquidation regime that has the effect of extending the
" See Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. v. FDIC, 536 F.2d 509, 513-15 (2d
Cir. 1976); Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 568
F.2d 911, 918-19 (2d Cir. 1977); J. Lawrence Westbrook, Developments in
Transnational Bankruptcy, 39 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 745 (1995).
4 See Ulrich Huber, Creditor Equality in Transnational Bankruptcies: The
United States Position, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 741 (1986); Kurt H.
Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught by
Herstatt and Company, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1977); Kurt H.Nadelmann, Dis-
crimination in Foreign Bankruptcy Laws Against Non-Domestic Claims, 47 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 147 (1973).
1s See 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942).
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domestic preference to non-domestic assets. All assets, including
foreign a sets, are brought into the receivership estate, but not for
the purpose of equal distribution. Instead, a class of domestic
claimants is given priority. Claimants of the same class, distin-
guishable only by the foreign situs of their claims, must stand in
line behind U.S. claimants for their share of the assets of the
branches with which they did business (who did not do business
with those branches). That regime surely is not a legitimate exer-
cise of the United States' prescriptive jurisdiction.
The U.S. liquidation regime is extraterritorial in that it pur-
ports to prescribe the status of assets and claims in other coun-
tries. While that feature does not make the regime illegal- the
United States has a basis for exercising its jurisdiction by reason
of the subject institution's U.S. nationality' - the exercise of such
jurisdiction is legitimate only if it is reasonable.77 A cross-border
liquidation regime may be reasonable only if it attempts to fairly
allocate assets and claims without discriminating on the basis of
nationality. The depositor-preference regime, though, discrimi-
nates on precisely that basis. The current Restatement of the For-
eign Relations Law of the United States identifies, among the fac-
tors relevant to assessing the reasonableness of an exercise of
jurisdiction, "the extent to which another state may have an in-
terest in regulating the activity""8 and "the likelihood of conflict
with regulation by another state."79 The state in which the for-
eign deposit is located has at least as much interest in regulating its
disposition as does the United States, because the claim and
probably the assets of the relevant branch as well as possibly the
claimant reside in that state and not in the United States, while
the likelihood of conflict with that state's regulation can fairly be
estimated at one-hundred percent.
The depositor-preference provision should be interpreted to
avoid effecting an extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction that is
unreasonable and hence in violation of international law.8" There
are two interpretations that would achieve that result: (1) foreign
deposits are deposits that benefit from the preference; and (2) liq-
76 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 5 402(2) cmt. e (1987).
77 See id. § 403.
78 Id. S 403(2)(g).
79 Id. § 403(2)(h).
10 See id. § 403 crnt. g.
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uidation of a multinational U.S. bank is to proceed on the sepa-
rate-entity basis. The second alternative, though it may appear
shocking, is by no means impossible. Indeed, the single-entity
approach to liquidation is nowhere explicitly stated in U.S. law,81
whereas there is an explicit statutory provision mandating sepa-
rate-entity liquidation of U.S. branches of foreign banks.82 Such
an interpretation, however, is senseless, for it would deprive the
supposed subordination of foreign deposits of effect. Foreign de-
posits would have priority over domestic deposits with respect to
the assets of their branch. In the event that those assets were not
sufficient to pay local claims in full and the foreign-deposit defi-
ciency claims were asserted in the U.S. liquidation, they would be
subordinate to the domestic-deposit claims; but in a separate-
entity regime, they would be subordinate regardless of their defi-
nitional exclusion from the preferred class. Clearly, a subordina-
tion of foreign deposits can be meaningful only in the context of a
single-entity liquidation- yet it is precisely in that context that
the concept is legally obnoxious.
Insisting on the subordinate status of foreign deposits, while
attempting to implement a single-entity liquidation of a U.S. mul-
tinational bank, would not be effective, as it is impossible to
imagine that foreign regulators would allow it. The effect of such
an attempt would simply be to force foreign governments to seg-
regate the assets of branches in their countries for the benefit of
claimants against those branches- that is, to implement a sepa-
rate-entity liquidation regime. Consequently, U.S. depositors and
the FDIC would obtain no benefit from the preference regime as
applied to foreign deposits backed by foreign assets. The prefer-
ence would be effective only with respect to those foreign
branches at which there were not sufficient matching assets-
branches whose principal purpose is foreign-deposit raising. Off-
shore Caribbean branches might fall into that category. The im-
mediate practical effect of implementing the depositor-preference
regime, as interpreted by the regulators, could be to put such
Of the statutory provisions cited in the FDIC Opinion, the only one
that specifically establishes a single-entity liquidation regime does not apply tobanks, but only to Edge Act corporations. See FDIG Opinion, supra note 2.
That single-entity liquidation regime is subject to the proviso that "the assets
of the corporation subject to the laws of other countries or jurisdictions shall
be dealt with in accordance with the terms of such laws." Federal Reserve Act
S 25A 19, 12 U.S.C. § 624 (1994).
82 12 U.S.C. $ 3102(i) (1994).
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branches out of business or at least to provoke the host regulators
to require that assets be dedicated to those branches in excess of
what prudent corporate finance would require.
5. SYSTEMIC RISK RESOLUTIONS
The regulators' current interpretation of the depositor-
preference provision increases the likelihood that a bank failure
involving foreign deposits will be treated as a case of "systemic
risk." As noted above, the "systemic risk" provision of the FDI
Act authorizes the FDIC to effect a non-least-cost resolution- a
transaction in which the FDIC covers some liabilities that are not
insured, at a cost greater than required to meet its insurance obli-
gation- if the transaction is required to avoid "serious adverse ef-
fects on economic conditions or financial stability." 
83
Banks holding foreign deposits include the largest banks in the
country. The failure of such a bank would already be a likely
candidate for a systemic risk resolution. The largest failed bank
that the FDIC ever resolved on a least-cost basis, so that unin-
sured depositors were not made whole in the resolution transac-
tion, was the First City bank group in 1992, which held approxi-
mately $9 billion in assets."4 America's largest banks today, after
eight years of rapid industry consolidation, dwarf First City.
They are ten, twenty, and thirty times its size. It would be sur-
prising if the FDIC, especially with its now shrunken staff, were
equipped to handle a liquidation or any other least-cost resolution
of such magnitude and complexity. Today's banks also dwarf the
largest banks that the FDIC had earlier resolved even on a non-
least-cost basis: Bank of New England, First Republic, the
MBanks, and Continental Illinois. In effecting these resolutions,
s12 U.S.C. § 1831r.
s The First City group comprised 20 closely affiliated banks. The unin-
sured deposits of only some of txem were left behind in their receiverships.
The other banks were rendered insolvent by exercise of the FDIC's "cross
guarantee" power. See id. Because the FDIC's cross-guarantee claim is subor-
dinate to claims of uninsured depositors, they were made whole. The First
City banks whose depositors were not made whole totaled approximately $6
billion in assets. See FDIC News Release PR-7-93 (an. 27, 1993). The "bridge
banks" created when the First City banks were closed, see 12 U.S.C. 183 1r,
attracted such large premiums from interested acquirers that uninsured deposi-
tors in all the First City banks were ultimately made whole, and there was sub-
stantial value left over for the bank's holding company, which consequently
was able to emerge successfully from bankruptcy reorganization. See FDIC
News Release PR-7-93 (an. 27, 1993)_
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the FDIC relied on the statutory predecessor of the "systemic
risk" authority."5 The regulators might well conclude that the
prospective failure of such huge banks posed a systemic risk, ei-
ther through the ripple effects of disrupted payment transactions,
through secondary failures of banks with federal-funds advances
to, or correspondent deposits at, the failing bank, or through
"contagion," a spreading loss of faith in the banking system as a
whole or some significant part of it, causing massive withdrawals
from other institutions.
Systemic risk could be aggravated if foreign deposits, a signifi-
cant class of an institution's funding base, found themselves sub-
ordinated and out of the money in a least-cost resolution. Regula-
tors might fear that foreign deposits in other large institutions,
especially if those banks were also troubled as part of a generally
adverse economic or financial conditions for banks, might be hur-
riedly withdrawn. Hence, the regulators might fear the weaken-
ing or failure of other banks and might consider it necessary to
protect the foreign deposits in the initially failing bank.86 There-
fore, treating foreign deposits as subordinate to domestic deposits
in liquidation could automatically cause any bank resolution in-
volving foreign deposits to be a systemic risk resolution, resulting
in foreign deposits being de facto insured for their full amount.
Congress clearly recognized the possibility that a bank failure
involving foreign deposits could pose a systemic risk, and it did
not want to preclude the regulators from covering foreign depos-
its in such a case. The ban on providing assistance to foreign de-
posits in section 41 of the FDI Act is subject to an exception for
transactions meeting the requirements of section 13(c), which in-
cludes the systemic risk authority. In the debates over that stat-
ute, at least one Senator noted regretfully that "past history and
the realities of the structure of our financial system suggest
85 See supra note 34.
86 Foreign-deposit holders are already aware of the risk of subordination.
For example, the Federal Reserve Board has instructed member banks to in-
form at least their U.S. depositors who make deposits in their foreign branches
that the deposits have a lower liquidation priority than domestic deposits,see
Federal Reserve Board Supervisory Letter SR 94-49(IB), Sept. 2, 1994, Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (GCH) 61-145 (1994), and that the member banks may have
adjusted their positions accordingly. Although they may consider the risk re-
mote while the banking industry is healthy, in troubled conditions, the lower
liquidation status coulcdlead to accelerating instability. They may also believe
that, whatever the law says, the regulators will be sure to make them whole in
a failure- a belief that, as discussed in the text, could be warranted.
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that.., the FDIC may at some point have to cover foreign depos-
its at large banks, in order to avert the collapse of our financial
system."8 7 Also, the conference debate over the systemic risk ex-
ception, described above, focused on how such resolutions involv-
ing foreign deposits should be paid for."8 In that debate, represen-
tatives of the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve
Board urged that the ability of regulators to cover uninsured li-
abilities in a systemic risk resolution should extend to foreign de-
posits, a position that the legislators adopted. 9
However, Congress clearly did not want foreign deposits to
be automatically protected. Indeed, when enacting the Improve-
ment Act in 1991, Congress acted against a perceived regulatory
practice of doing just that. In response, Congress reinforced the
uninsured status of foreign deposits by enacting section 41 of the
FDI Act, with its prohibition on providing special protection for
foreign deposits. Three years later, in 1994, Congress reinforced
the exclusion of foreign deposits from the definition of "deposits"
that receive insurance coverage.' Furthermore, in 1991, the legis-
lators were generally opposed to the "too big to fail" policies of
the FDIC, and were particularly opposed to the protection of for-
eign deposits as part of those policies. Accordingly, they acted to
restrict those practices. Congress may have been concerned that
regulators were too eager to effect a non-least-cost resolution be-
cause of the characteristic bureaucratic risk-avoiding mentality:
government officials would rather spend money than risk a con-
spicuous and market-disruptive event for which they might be
blamed. Congress had several reasons for objecting to such prac-
tices. On a theoretical level, too liberal protection of participants
in the financial sector damages market discipline, leads to ineffi-
cient market behavior and allocation of resources, and may con-
tribute to the fragility of the banking industry. 1 On a practical
87 137 CONG. REC. S16906 (Nov. 18, 1991) (statement of Sen. Conrad).
88 See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
"' "[The systemic risk exception] needs to extend to the protection of for-
eign deposits as well. So what that means is that the flat ban on foreign depos-
its on protecting them under any circumstances doesn't work from the stand-
point of a systemic risk exception. The systemic risk exception has to apply as
well to foreign deposits in our view." Conference Transcript,supra note 43, at
129-30 (remarks of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury JayPowell).
90 See supra notes 6, 58.
91 See H.R. REP. No. 102-330, at 94 (1991); S. REP. No. 102-167, at 45
(1991).
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and political level, Congress was concerned that the FDIC was
spending too much money, contributing to the then-perceived in-
solvency of the bank insurance fund and the possibility of a tax-
payer bail-out.92 Congress also objected to the inequity of little
banks and their uninsured depositors not being covered while big
banks were protected, an inequity exacerbated by the sense that
big banks paid less for deposit insurance because their foreign de-
posits were not assessed and possibly by the perception that hold-
ers of foreign deposits were likely to be foreigners.93
Congress implemented its goal to cut back on "too big to fail"
transactions in two ways. First, it raised and multiplied the pro-
cedural hurdles necessary to effect a systemic risk resolution.
Whereas prior to the Improvement Act, the FDIC could effect
such a transaction on its own initiative with a majority vote of its
board of directors, now the decision must be made by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, upon recommendation of both the FDIC
and the Federal Reserve each acting by a supermajority vote of its
board, and after consultation with the President.94 Second, Con-
gress enacted what it thought was a higher substantive standard
for justifying such a transaction. While the earlier "essentiality"
exception could be applied to a smaller institution whose contin-
ued operation was deemed essential to provide services in its
community, the current systemic risk exception implicitly applies
only to institutions whose failure could have a serious adverse af-
fect on the stability of the financial system as a whole. In the
words of the Senate Banking Committee Report, the exception is
intended to be used only in "those rare instances in which the
failure of an institution could threaten the entire financial sys-
tem."
95
Congress' obvious desire to limit the number of "too big to
fail" transactions is a further reason why the depositor-preference
provision should not be interpreted as creating a structure that
might artificially drive the regulators toward systemic risk resolu-
tions.
92 See H.R. REP. No. 102-330, at 96 (1991); S. REP. No. 102-167, at 3-4, 44
(1991); 137 CONG. REC. S16903-04.
93 See 137 CONG. REC. S16903-04.
94 See FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. S 1823(c)(4)(G)(i).
95 S. REP. No. 102-167, at 45.
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6. CONCLUSION
During the unusually prosperous period for the American
banking industry since the enactment of the federal depositor-
preference regime, no American bank holding foreign deposits
has failed. If such a failure should occur, however, and if the law
should be allowed to have its effect as presently interpreted, the
consequences could be severe. The FDIC should exercise its sub-
stantial ability to interpret its own statute96 to change its present
interpretation of the depositor-preference provision, and should
instead adopt the interpretation that is much more likely to re-
flect the intent of Congress. In order to promote market cer-
tainty, the FDIC should take that action now, at a time when the
industry's prosperity offers the regulators the luxury of engaging
in reasoned deliberation and the opportunity to establish a legal
structure that will work smoothly when the industry encounters
its next time of troubles.
96 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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APPENDIX A
IMPACT OF DEPOSITOR PREFERENCE ON LIQUIDATION
RECOVERIES BY HOLDERS OF FOREIGN DEPOSITS
If foreign deposits are classified with general-creditor claims
rather than with domestic deposits, the effect on them of a de-
positor-preference regime in the liquidation of an insolvent bank
can be severe. How severe depends on the proportion of domes-
tic to foreign deposits, as shown below.
In the absence of depositor preference, the liquidation recov-
ery ratio on foreign-deposit claims (Rfd) is the same as the liquida-
tion recovery ratio for other deposit claims and for general-
creditor claims: assuming no secured or otherwise preferred li-
abilities, the ratio is the assets (A) of the failed institution divided
by its liabilities (L).
A
Rfd-
L
But if the insolvent institution's domestic deposits (Dd) rank
ahead of foreign deposits and other general-creditor liabilities,
then they must be subtracted from both assets and liabilities, and
the remaining assets, if any, must be divided among the remaining
liabilities.
A-Dd
Rfd = -L- Dd
If we assume a hypothetical failed bank holding assets with a
net liquidation value of $80 million and with liabilities of $100
million, of which $90 million are deposit liabilities, we can graph
the recovery ratio on foreign-deposit claims as a function of the
ratio of domestic deposits to foreign deposits as follows:
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In this hypothetical example, the recovery rate on foreign de-
posits drops to zero when the ratio of domestic deposits to all de-
posits rises to 89%.
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APPENDIX B
IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ASSESSING THE
COST OF A SYSTEMIC RISK RESOLUTION OF A BANK
HOLDING FOREIGN DEPOSITS
In 1991, Congress considered (though perhaps not with equal
seriousness) at least three different regimes for paying the cost of
systemic risk resolutions in which the foreign deposits of the
failed or failing bank were made whole.
Alternative A:
Foreign deposits are insured as are domestic deposits. Costs of
all resolutions are borne (either with or without a special assess-
ment) by the deposit base, including foreign deposits.
Alternative B:
As proposed by the Senate, the incremental cost of covering
the foreign deposits is recovered by a special assessment on banks
holding foreign deposits in proportion to the amount of foreign
deposits that they hold.
Alternative C:
The incremental cost of a systemic risk transaction is recov-
ered by a special assessment on banks proportional to their liabil-
ity bases (defined as total liabilities, not including capital or sub-
ordinated debt). As this was the alternative that was enacted in
the FDIC Improvement Act, 12 U.S.C. S 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii), it may
be called the FDICIA Alternative.
Let us assume that there is a single bank failure in the relevant
accounting period, and that it is addressed as a systemic risk reso-
lution. Under those assumptions, the cost Cf of that resolution
borne by each unit of foreign deposits held elsewhere in the U.S.
banking system is as follows:
Alternative A:
The incremental cost X of covering foreign deposits in the
systemic risk transaction is distributed over all deposits D in the
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banking system, including both foreign and domestic deposits. So
the incremental cost per unit of foreign deposits X,is given by:
x
D
However, the foreign deposits are also paying a share of all
other costs of the resolution. Consequently, the per unit share of
foreign deposits Cf in the total cost C of the resolution is given
by:
C
C 1 =
D
Alternative B:
In the special assessment, the incremental cost X of covering
foreign deposits is borne entirely by the total foreign deposits Df,
therefore:
x
Df
Since, under this alternative, foreign deposits have no share in
other portions of total cost C, their per unit share in C is the same
as their per unit share in the incremental cost X
X
Df
FDICIA Alternative:
The incremental cost of the systemic risk resolution is assessed
on total liabilities.
That incremental cost is not necessarily limited to the cost of
covering foreign deposits, but would also include the cost of cov-
ering other liabilities that the government decided needed to be
covered. Those liabilities plausibly could include domestic depos-
its in excess of the insurance limit, as well as non-deposit liabilities
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like bank notes and federal funds purchased. In an open-bank as-
sistance transaction such as the resolution of Continental Illinois,
all liabilities would ordinarily be protected by the nature of the
transaction; in other transaction forms involving the closure of
the bank and the creation of a receivership estate, they need not
be. The language of the statute, which authorizes the FDIC to
take such action "as necessary to avoid or mitigate such adverse
[economic or financial] effects,"'7 is reinforced by the legislative
history indicating Congress's desire to cut back on such transac-
tions and compels the conclusion that the government must not
protect liabilities beyond those necessary to avert the systemic
risk it has identified, if the institution's liabilities can be feasibly
split apart. Assuming in our hypothetical case that the govern-
ment decides to protect foreign deposits and excess domestic de-
posits but not non-deposit liabilities, then foreign deposits' per
unit share in the non-least-cost portion of the transaction is:
X+Y
L
where Y is the cost of covering the excess domestic deposits. Be-
cause foreign deposits do not share in the least-cost portion of the
resolution, their per-unit share in the total cost C of the resolu-
tion is likewise:
X+Y
L
The FDICIA Alternative is clearly the least costly for foreign
deposits. Assuming a hypothetical scenario in which total depos-
its in the banking system D are $10 trillion, of which foreign de-
posits Df are $1 trillion, total liabilities L in the banking system
are $10.75 trillion, and the total cost of the systemic risk resolu-
tion C is $2 billion of which the incremental cost X of covering
the failed bank's foreign deposits is $200 million and the incre-
mental cost Y of covering excess domestic deposits is also $200
million, while non-deposit liabilities are not covered, then the
97 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G)q) (emphasis added).
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cost of that resolution borne by each million dollars of foreign
deposits elsewhere in the banking system under each payment al-
ternative is as follows:
Table I
Cost per million dollars of foreign deposits
Alternative A $200
Alternative B $200
FDICIA Alternative $37.20
The U.S. deposit-insurance regime is no stranger to disparities
in treatment: insurance premiums are assessed on the full amount
of domestic deposits, but only amounts up to $100,000 are pro-
tected. Nevertheless, the huge disparity in the contributions
made by foreign deposits to resolution costs under the different
alternatives described above suggests that the statute is not being
correctly interpreted. Perhaps the special assessment called for by
FDI Act § 13 (c) (4) (G) (ii) is intended to recoup the total cost of the
systemic risk resolution rather than simply the cost in excess of
that entailed by a least-cost resolution.
The language of the statute, which refers to "the loss to the
appropriate insurance fund resulting from any action taken or as-
sistance provided... under clause (i)"98 (which authorizes the
FDIC to take action to avert adverse systemic effects) suggests the
concept of incremental cost, but could be interpreted the other
way. Similarly, if the cost of a least-cost transaction is adequately
covered by the standard assessment on insured deposits, one could
plausibly assume that a special assessment triggered by a systemic
risk resolution would recover only the incremental cost of that
transaction, that being the portion of the cost that is not already
adequately provided for. That assumption, however, may not be
warranted if the mechanism of the special assessment results in
the cost of protecting certain classes of liabilities being paid pri-
marily by other classes of liabilities that arguably received no
benefit from the extra coverage and are already paying separately
for the protection they receive.
9 12 U.S.C. § 1823(b)(G)(ii).
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Assuming the statute calls for the special assessment to recover
the total cost of the systemic risk resolution, and not the incre-
mental cost, then the cost per unit of foreign deposits is given by:
C
L
Applying that formula to the hypothetical scenario described
above yields the following results:
Table II
Alternative A
Alternative B
FDICIA Alternative
Cost per million dollars of foreign deposits
$200
$200
$186
The FDICIA Alternative is now only slightly cheaper for for-
eign deposits than are Alternatives A and B. The slight cost ad-
vantage results from some of the cost of the resolution being
borne by non-deposit liabilities even though, on our assumptions,
they contributed nothing to that cost. If we modify those as-
sumptions and assume a transaction in which non-deposit liabili-
ties are covered, at an additional cost of, say, $150 million, then
the results are as follows:
Table III
Alternative A
Alternative B
FDICIA Alternative
Cost per million dollars of foreign deposits
$215
$200
$200
In this scenario the costs to foreign deposits of the FDICIA
Alternative and Alternative B are exactly the same. Alternative A
is slightly more expensive to foreign deposits, because that alter-
native, while the non-deposit liabilities are contributing to the
cost of the resolution, they are not assessed for any part of that
cost; instead, the incremental cost attributable to them is borne
entirely by deposits, including foreign deposits.
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The hypothetical scenario represented in Table III merits at-
tention because there are at least two reasons why non-deposit li-
abilities might be covered. First, the government might conclude
that those liabilities in themselves would pose a systemic risk if
not made whole. Second, in order not to make them whole with
the deposit liabilities- and to leave general creditors with their
pro rata share of the insolvent bank's assets- it would be neces-
sary to close the bank and create a receivership estate against
which the non-deposit creditors would claim. In the case of a
huge contemporary bank,99 the FDIC might conclude that the
process of closing the bank and attempting to disentangle the pro-
tected from the unprotected interests would be too disruptive
even to the interests that the FDIC was trying to protect, and that
the only feasible resolution would be one in which, as with Con-
tinental Illinois, the bank is left open and continues to operate
with FDIC assistance. Such a resolution would necessarily pro-
tect the non-deposit liabilities. In the conference debate that re-
sulted in adoption of the systemic risk provision as enacted in the
Improvement Act, one Congressman proposed that open-
assistance transactions not be permitted. That proposal was re-
jected, with one Senator going so far as to suggest that the princi-
pal purpose of the systemic risk exception was to permit such
open assistance in cases of systemic risk: "I think the general view
[in the Senate] is that the intervention is to try to prevent a fail-ure." 100
The problem with the whole-cost interpretation of the
FDICIA Alternative, as shown in Table II and even more clearly
in Table 11, is that it does not provide a significant cost advantage
(or in the case of Table III, any cost advantage) to foreign deposits
over the Senate-devised special assessment (Alternative B) that was
the FDICIA Alternative's principal competitor for the confer-
ence's approval. Yet, the FDICIA Alternative was adopted pre-
cisely because it was thought to be better for foreign deposits:
Mr. Schumer.... Will this type of ex post facto assess-
ment, ... why don't you think it will drive money out of,
out of U.S. banks and into others?...
9' See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
0 Conference Transcript, supra note 43, at 134-35.
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Mr. Powell [Treasury Department]. It ought not to, be-
cause the assessment will be spread over the entire funding
base of the banking system and not focused simply on for-
eign deposits.1"'
The necessary conclusion is that Congress intended the special
assessment, as suggested by the statute's language, to recover only
incremental costs, with the effects shown in Table I.
101 Id.
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